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8.8.2 Nevada General
8.8.2 (121)
Comment - 4 comments summarized
Commenters stated that the EIS did not consider scoping comments, advice, and reference documents submitted to DOE from affected counties and State agencies in Nevada. As a consequence, the EIS ignores a host of important community issues that would reasonably be expected to be considered in a project of this scope and significance. Another commenter said that the information necessary to make an accurate assessment of the impacts to Nevada from spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste transport is available, not exorbitant to gather, and should be obtained and included in the EIS prior to any agency decision, as required by the National Environmental Policy Act.
Response
In analyzing potential impacts of transporting spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to Yucca Mountain, DOE evaluated the potential for impacts in Nevada and counties within the region of influence in multiple environmental resource areas considered in the environmental impact analyses. These resource areas, described in Section 6.3 of the EIS, include land use; air quality; hydrology; biological resources and soils; cultural resources; human health and safety; socioeconomics; aesthetics; noise; waste management; utilities, energy, and materials; and environmental justice.
To analyze the potential for impacts that could affect environmental resources, DOE collected and considered large amounts of information, including information provided by the State of Nevada and counties in the State. For the analyses, DOE used information that it judged to be relevant and reasonable. For example, based on comments submitted during scoping hearings for the EIS, DOE added consideration of the Caliente-Chalk Mountain Corridor and Caliente/Chalk Mountain heavy-haul truck route. In response to public comments on the Draft EIS, DOE used projections of population growth in Nevada provided by Clark and Nye Counties and the Nevada State Demographer for updated information presented in the Final EIS. DOE reviewed many documents produced by Lincoln County and other county and State agencies. The transportation-related information contained in those documents was considered for inclusion in the EIS. Nevada highway traffic information was collected from the Nevada Department of Transportation (DIRS 103405-NDOT 1997). DOE obtained and used accident rates for Nevada highways from the Department of Motor Vehicles and Public Safety, State of Nevada (see Section J.1.4.2.3 of the EIS). DOE used information contained in a report prepared for the City of North Las Vegas (DIRS 155112-Berger Group 2000). The information in that report provided DOE with an estimate of the cost of advancing completion of the Las Vegas Beltway for use by heavy-haul trucks, an estimate of the populations that could live along the Beltway, and a basis for estimating the dose to a maximally exposed individual in a Nevada community from transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to Yucca Mountain. DOE also used information in Statewide Radioactive Materials Transportation Plan, Phase II to identify candidate alternative highway routes for shipments of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste that the State of Nevada has considered in the past (DIRS 103072-Ardila Coulson 1989).
DOE does not believe it necessary to consider population characteristics on a community-by-community basis to determine potential public health and safety impacts from the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The use of widely accepted analytical tools, latest reasonably available information, and cautious but reasonable assumptions if there are uncertainties, offer the most appropriate means to arrive at conservative estimates of transportation-related impacts.
8.8.2 (135)
Comment - 18 comments summarized
Several commenters identified the economic and multi-use benefits of sharing a branch rail line. The commenters stated that rail routes could enhance access to mining and mineral resource areas. One commenter offered specific considerations for the placement of a rail line near Pahrump to the west near the Von Schmidt survey line. The commenter contended this location would offer safety, aesthetic advantages, and multiple-use transportation benefits. Several commenters asked about ownership of the tracks and rights-of-way, and the final disposition of the branch rail line. Other commenters expressed concern about shared use negatively affecting the safety and environmental risk of transportation. Commenters remarked that because shared use was not specifically addressed, the true impacts of such situations are not known and decisions cannot be made. One commenter stated that the Draft EIS was a legally insufficient assessment of rail transportation risks and impacts because it provided incomplete and contradictory information on rail operating assumptions and failed to address the safety and environmental implications of potential shared use of the rail line for shipments of commercial explosives, military weapons and munitions, petroleum products, and other hazardous materials.
Response
If the Yucca Mountain site was approved, DOE believes that the EIS provides the environmental impact information necessary to make certain broad transportation-related decisions, namely the choice of a national mode of transportation outside Nevada (mostly rail or mostly legal-weight truck), the choice among alternative transportation modes in Nevada (mostly rail, mostly legal-weight truck, or heavy-haul truck with use of an associated intermodal transfer station), and the choice among alternative rail corridors or heavy-haul truck routes with use of an associated intermodal transfer station in Nevada. However, follow-on implementing decisions, such as the selection of a specific rail alignment in a corridor, would require additional field surveys, State and local government and Native American tribal consultations, environmental and engineering analyses, and appropriate National Environmental Policy Act reviews.
DOE identified the potential for shared use in Section 8.4.2 of the EIS as a reasonably foreseeable future action. This section states "DOE would have to consider these impacts [of shared use] in any decision it made to allow shared use of the branch rail line." If the Yucca Mountain site was approved, then decisions regarding ownership and shared use would be made. Line ownership, however, would not affect potential environmental impacts.
Regarding rail corridor alignments different from those identified in the EIS, as discussed in Sections 6.3.2 and J.3.1.2 of the EIS, DOE has narrowed its consideration for a branch rail line to five candidate rail corridors through a process of screening rail alignments it has studied. The sections identify six earlier studies. For example, in the Nevada Potential Repository Preliminary Transportation Strategy, Study 2, February 1996, the Department evaluated a rail alternative called the Stewart Valley Alternate (DIRS 101214-CRWMS M&O 1996). This corridor alignment west of Pahrump was removed from further consideration because of the greater potential for land-use conflicts than in the corridors evaluated in the EIS. Chapter 4 of that report discusses potential operations of a branch rail line. Because use of the branch rail line to transport materials to Yucca Mountain would continue until 2034 under the Proposed Action, it would be premature at this time for the Department to make a decision on the use or disposition of the branch rail line after emplacement operations were completed.
Impacts, including impacts to human health and safety, biological resources, land use, aesthetics, and multiple other resource areas, of constructing and using a branch rail line for transporting spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to Yucca Mountain are discussed in Section 6.3.2 of the EIS. In response to public comments, DOE has enhanced and clarified its analyses and discussions of these impacts. The Department’s Rail Alignment Analysis provides evaluations of branch rail lines in each of the five candidate rail corridors (DIRS 131242-CRWMS M&O 1997). The evaluations are based on requirements and standards contained in the American Railway Engineering Association and U.S. Department of Transportation regulations and Federal Railroad Administration Track Safety Standards. Included are standards for railroad crossings over highways.
8.8.2 (179)
Comment - 3 comments summarized
Commenters said that the EIS should discuss past and current impacts to Nevada residents from the transportation of radiological materials and hazardous materials along the candidate routes for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste shipments to Yucca Mountain. By so doing, the EIS can then determine the cumulative impacts to populations in Nevada who have been repeatedly exposed to these materials.
Response
Section 8.4.1.2 of the EIS presents the cumulative impacts of radioactive material transportation in the United States since 1943. These cumulative impacts include the impacts of historic DOE shipments, which include shipments associated with the Nevada Test Site (see Table 8-58). Table 8-58 lists the impacts for the expanded use of the Nevada Test Site. Even if all the impacts from historic DOE shipments were allocated to Nevada, the impacts would be extremely small, about a 0.1 chance of a latent cancer fatality among members of the affected population.
Section 8.4.2.7 of the EIS describes the Nevada transportation impacts and states that the estimated total collective worker dose from the entire DOE low-level radioactive waste intermodal shipping campaign, including transportation impacts, would be about 4.2 person-rem. The population dose associated with low-level radioactive waste shipments by truck would be about 7.6 person-rem for the entire shipping campaign. These impacts are extremely small, less than about a 0.01 chance of a single latent cancer fatality among members of the affected population.
8.8.2 (188)
Comment - 2 comments summarized
Commenters stated that the proposed repository raises a number of concerns for the citizens of Nye County. These include a number of transportation issues. The national transportation network shown in the Draft EIS points to the fact that shipment of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste by truck, rail, or intermodal routes would funnel all of the shipments through Nye County. The United States must take all steps necessary to ensure safe transport methods are implemented, that Nye County residents are not subjected to additional risk, whether radiological or safety related, and Nye County be given the capability to respond to any accidents within its jurisdiction.
The transportation analysis and Draft EIS fails to consider the safety hazards along specific routes. Furthermore, by not including the mitigation measure required to safely use these roads for such a shipping campaign, DOE has failed to inform the decisionmakers of the implications of impacts that would accompany repository operations.
Response
As discussed in the EIS, accidents involving spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste shipments could occur. However, of the approximately 53,000 truck shipments, there would be an estimated 66 accidents, each having less than a 0.01-percent chance that radioactive materials would be released. The chance of a rail accident that would cause a release from a cask would be even less. Of the thousands of shipments completed in the United States over the last 30 years, none has resulted in an injury through the release of radioactive materials.
Regardless, in response to comments, DOE has revised the EIS by adding Appendix M to provide information on DOE funding for improvements in emergency response training and capabilities along the routes (see Section M.5 of the EIS). State and tribal governments have primary responsibility to respond to and to protect the public health and safety in their jurisdictions from accidents involving radioactive materials. Section 180(c) of the NWPA requires DOE to provide technical assistance and funds to states for training of public safety officials of appropriate units of local government and tribes through whose jurisdictions it would transport spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. In 1998, DOE published a Notice of Revised Proposed Policy and Procedures in the Federal Register (63 FR 23753; April 30, 1998) that sets forth the proposed mechanisms for implementing the requirements of Section 180(c). As part of this program, about 4 years prior to the first shipments, eligible jurisdictions would receive a one-time planning grant to assess their training needs. In accordance with the Section 180(c) Policy and Procedures, jurisdictions could use a certain percentage of their financial assistance to purchase appropriate (for example, training-related) equipment that can be used for training, inspections, and emergency response. This could include the detection equipment mentioned in the comment. See Section M.6 for a detailed discussion of the Section 180(c) provisions and emergency response programs. If requested, DOE and other Federal agencies can assist in responding to an incident.
DOE has several programs available to provide assistance to state, tribal, and local governments in response to radioactive material accidents. The Radiological Assistance Program, for example, provides trained personnel with equipment to evaluate, assess, advise, and assist in the mitigation and monitoring of potential immediate hazards associated with a transportation accident. As part of the program, DOE maintains eight Regional Coordinating Offices across the country that are staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The staff consists of nuclear engineers, health physicists, industrial hygienists, public affairs specialists, and other personnel who provide field monitoring, sampling, decontamination, communications, and other services, as requested. In addition, DOE’s Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) focuses on providing rapid medical attention to people involved in radiation accidents. REAC/TS maintains a 24-hour response center to provide direct support, including deployable equipment and personnel trained and experienced in the treatment of radiation exposure, to assist Federal, state, tribal, and local organizations.
DOE believes that the EIS adequately analyzes transportation-related impacts that could result from the Proposed Action. DOE also believes that the EIS provides the information necessary to make decisions on the basic approaches to transporting spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste (either rail or truck shipments), as well as the choice among alternative rail corridors in Nevada, if the site was recommended and approved. See the introduction to Chapter 8 of this Comment-Response Document for more information.
8.8.2 (419)
Comment - EIS000071 / 0017
Again, DOE has placed their federal emission requirements over the health and safety concerns of the citizens of Nye County.
Response
DOE believes that there is a transcription error in this comment and that "emission" should be "mission." The Yucca Mountain Project Manager, Russell Dyer, in testimony before the Nevada Senate Transportation Committee on March 22, 2001, stated, "I want to reaffirm that protection of public health and safety is our foremost objective for a potential repository and related transportation system. We remain committed to completing our ongoing scientific and technical evaluation before determining whether to recommend approval of Yucca Mountain to the President." He further stated, "We are committed to safe transportation of radioactive materials within Nevada and throughout the country, whether by highway or rail and have demonstrated our ability to work cooperatively with state authorities in conducting the Department’s transportation of radioactive material."
8.8.2 (1170)
Comment - EIS000229 / 0003
The DEIS discussion of HHT [heavy-haul truck] safety issues is also deficient. Because of the lack of actual experience with long distance HHT shipments, no meaningful empirical data is available to support the DEIS assertion that accidents risks "are low for all five [route] alternatives." [p.6-96] HHT operations on the routes identified in the DEIS may experience substantially higher accidents frequencies and consequences. For example, using Nevada average accident rates, and projected shipment-miles for DOE’s Module 2 scenario, the expected number of HHT accidents on the Caliente route would be about 24 (12 loaded, 12 empty) over 39 years. The severity and consequences of accidents could be greater because of unique local hazards. Steep upgrades and downgrades (especially in combination with horizontal curves less than 800 feet radius) and critical side slopes and steep drop-offs (common near the summits of mountain passes) could subject casks to extreme accident impact forces and make emergency response, cask recovery, and post-accident cleanup difficult. Such conditions appear to exist near Oak Springs Summit on US 93, near Hancock Summit on SR 375, and at several other locations along the Caliente HHT route.
Response
Heavy-haul truck impacts were calculated using the Primary road rates in Saricks and Tompkins (DIRS 103455-1999). Although the document does not explicitly address heavy-haul truck accident rates, DOE believes this document provides the best available consistent data set for the impact analyses. The accident rates used in the analysis were conservative because of the special precautions taken by heavy-haul truck shipments to prevent accidents, such as restricting travel to daylight hours and providing escort vehicles in front of and behind the trucks. The heavy-haul trucks could affect the accident rates for other vehicles. However, the additional precautions described above in addition to the planned road improvements would mitigate these effects. As a result, DOE believes the analysis of heavy-haul truck accident frequencies is adequate for its intended purpose.
The commenter expressed concern that the severity and consequences could be greater because of unique local hazards. In the analysis of accidents, these events are termed "initiating events." A large number of specific initiating events can be identified by review of historic transportation accidents or by the imagination. These include collisions with fixed objects (bridge abutments, walls, barriers, etc.), collisions with other vehicles and animals, rollovers, jackknifes, derailments, and collisions at grade crossings. Any initiating event can be characterized in terms of its mechanical forces and heat, and the event can then be categorized according to the matrix shown in Figure J-8, which is the transportation accident risk model used in the EIS. This model was taken from Sprung et al. (DIRS 152476-2000). As a consequence, it is not necessary to analyze every possible initiating event individually because the range of accidents included in the report encompasses all credible initiating events.
Regardless of the specific initiating event and type or transport vehicle, the severity of a transportation accident can be characterized by the combination of mechanical forces and heat involved in the accident and imposed on the cask. Mechanical forces account for the severity of the crash itself, while heat accounts for the severity of fire that could be involved in the accident. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission report concluded that only a tiny fraction of all accidents, less than one in 10,000, would be severe enough to fail a spent nuclear fuel shipping cask (DIRS 152476-Sprung et al. 2000). The reason for this is the rigorous design, performance, and testing requirements (see 10 CFR Part 71) for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste shipping casks. This study reaffirmed that the spent nuclear fuel transportation regulations provide adequate protection of public health and safety. The report is an update of the accident risk model used in the Draft EIS that was referred to as the Modal Study (DIRS 101828-Fischer et al. 1987).
8.8.2 (1796)
Comment - EIS000616 / 0003
And the last thing I would like to say is I tried to find a more detailed map on exactly where the railroads go, particularly Lander County, and that wasn’t available.
Response
Appendix J of the EIS refers to the Nevada Potential Repository Preliminary Transportation Strategy, Study 1 (DIRS 104795-CRWMS M&O 1995) and the Nevada Potential Repository Preliminary Transportation Strategy, Study 2 (DIRS 101214-CRWMS M&O 1996), among others, which provide information on the rail corridor alignment including detailed maps. Detailed maps of the alternative routes are included in Appendix J.
8.8.2 (3067)
Comment - EIS000619 / 0008
Another area where the draft is deficient is in its treatment of existing rail and highway within Nevada. For example, from West Wendover to Beowawe, the interstate and Union Pacific rail line go through several communities and cross the Humboldt several times, and you would never know that from reading the draft.
Response
The portions of routes that use existing rail and highways within Nevada were analyzed for each of the transportation implementing alternatives in Nevada as part of the national transportation analysis discussed in Sections 6.2.3.1 and 6.2 3.2 of the EIS. The range of impacts associated with this analysis can be found in Tables 6-8 and 6-9 for legal-weight trucks and Tables 6-11 and 6-12 for railroads. Maps of the representative national routes analyzed are given in Figures 6-11 and 6-12. In addition to analyzing the impacts of using routes that would meet U.S. Department of Transportation requirements for transporting spent nuclear fuel, DOE evaluated how the estimated impacts would differ if legal-weight trucks or railroads used other routes in Nevada in Section J.3.1. This section describes alternate routes and alignments within Nevada, identifies differences in lengths and population distributions, lists potential infrastructure upgrade needs, and assesses the impacts to individuals and populations along each of these routes. Comparisons of impacts based on populations along specific highways in Nevada are provided in Table J-48. Both the rail and highway transportation analyses have taken into account the population of the communities along the routes and the estimated accident characteristics of the given routes. Specific incident rates for Nevada routes were provided by the State and used in the analyses.
8.8.2 (4125)
Comment - EIS001458 / 0002
DOE could improve its transportation analysis by including a strong statement in the final environmental impact statement regarding the inherent safety of used fuel transportation and robust packages used to transport nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. DOE should also put the risks associated with spent fuel transportation in perspective such that it’s evident to members of the public and policy makers and clearly identifies that transportation risks associated with the proposed action are small.
Response
The results presented in the EIS demonstrate that the impacts of transporting spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste would be low, in large part due to the use of robust packaging. The EIS attempts to place these risks in perspective in the Summary and in Chapter 6 of the EIS. A discussion of cask safety and testing and operational protocols designed to enhance safety has been added in Appendix M.
8.8.2 (4168)
Comment - EIS000544 / 0002
As far as the infrastructure impacts are concerned, we found no inventory of locations that need remedial activity within the DEIS. There were no calculations to determine these costs. No comparisons of the benefit costs for rail as opposed to heavy-haul. And pretty much that the verbiage around heavy-haul assumes that this is something that our highway system now can sustain.
There’s been a plethora of media coverage about the autoclave deliveries that we have had and these vehicle configurations to haul these amounts into our state. There’s been an assumption that our heavy-haul casks, heavy-haul operations would be somewhat like that.
And the public should really realize that we only really permit about one of those vehicles a year and that we’re looking at something on the neighborhood of two loaded vehicles a day going into the site and then two unloaded vehicles that are only 200,000 pounds of less weight going out of the site back to the intermodal facility. It’s not a campaign that is run smoothly or efficiently, I guess is the word I can use.
Lastly, as far as the operations considerations of heavy-haul, we found absolutely no estimate of what traffic queues would be accumulated behind these convoys.
Response
Section J.3.1.2 of the EIS addresses the routes in Nevada for transporting rail casks, including heavy-haul trucks and railroads. Additional details of the rail and heavy-haul truck system infrastructure requirements and assumptions used to establish their preliminary designs are included in the EIS references listed in Section 12 as Transportation Engineering File: Road Upgrades for Heavy Haul Truck Routes–Design Analysis (DIRS 154448-CRWMS M&O 1998), and Rail Alignment Analysis (DIRS 131242-CRWMS M&O 1997). These analyses contain plan and profile drawings of the five rail corridors, and rail alignment maps showing land usage with respect to the location of the rail corridor.
Sections 6.3.3.1 and 6.3.2.1 of the EIS contain cost ranges of the five rail corridors and heavy-haul truck routes with a life-cycle cost for rail ranging from $283 million to $880 million, and for heavy haul truck life-cycle costs ranging from $387 million to $669 million. Detailed costs associated with these systems are included in Cost Estimate for Heavy Haul Truck Transport Design (DIRS 154675-Ahmer 1998) and Nevada Transportation Study Construction Cost Estimate (DIRS 154822-CRWMS M&O 1998).
DOE has identified mostly rail as its preferred mode of transportation, both nationally and in Nevada. However, should heavy-haul truck transport be selected as the preferred mode, detailed engineering and environmental studies, including dynamic traffic analysis, would be performed on the selected road route. A detailed dynamic traffic analysis would identify potential traffic queues for each route section. The road upgrades listed in Section J.3.1.2 of the EIS that have been proposed would then be modified to minimize traffic impacts. A specific cost/benefit analysis of the two scenarios, rail versus heavy-haul truck, has not been performed and is generally not necessary to support current decisionmaking.
8.8.2 (4286)
Comment - EIS001160 / 0094
Page 3-99, Section 3.2.2 address legal weight truck shipments on U.S. Highway 95. Does failure of the DEIS imply that legal weight shipments would not be allowed on other routes without supplemental NEPA [National Environmental Policy Act] documentation? The DEIS should indicate what, if any, supplemental NEPA documentation would be required for a route other than those assessed within the DEIS.
Page 3-99, Section 3.2.2 implies that only data for U.S. Highway 95 was used in the analysis. If this is the case, the analysis may not accurately represent risks of shipping fuel on other Nevada highways. Nevada’s highways are characterized by unique traffic patterns, load levels, seasonal environmental conditions and physiography.
Response
The routes chosen for analysis for the legal-weight truck case were selected based on U.S. Department of Transportation rules for routing shipments of spent nuclear fuel. Briefly stated, these rules require shipments to use Interstate System highways wherever possible. When it is necessary to leave the Interstate Highway System, the rules require using the shortest route to the destination. Thus, the EIS analyzed Interstate-15 and then U.S. 95 to the repository. Additional information on route selection can be found in Appendix M of the EIS. If a state wishes, it can designate alternate routes using Federal guidelines. Nevada has not done so. If the State was to designate alternate routes, which would include conducting a safety analysis, DOE would follow those routes.
In addition to analyzing the impacts of using highway routes that would meet U.S. Department of Transportation requirements for transporting spent nuclear fuel, DOE evaluated how the estimated impacts would differ if legal-weight trucks used other routes in Nevada. Six other routes identified in a 1989 study by the Nevada Department of Transportation were used in the analysis. A discussion of this analysis can be found in Section J.3.1.3 of the EIS.
8.8.2 (4300)
Comment - EIS001160 / 0109
Page 6-38, Section 6.3.1. Although proposed shipments using legal weight trucks would represent only a fraction (about 1 percent) of total truck traffic on Nevada highways, because of the nature of the material shipped, the impact on such things as socioeconomics, aesthetics and perception by the public could be significant. The relationship to regular commercial traffic is only applicable in the amount of fossil fuels burned and related impacts. Truck volume and other impact experiences from transport of spent fuel and other nuclear and hazardous wastes should be used to determine impacts of transportation.
Response
As described in Section 6.3 of the EIS, DOE’s analysis of impacts from legal-weight trucks on Nevada highways does include socioeconomics and aesthetics. The topics considered for socioeconomics include changes in employment, personal income, populations, Gross Regional Product, and state and local government expenditures. The region of influence for the analysis included Clark, Lincoln, and Nye Counties. The other Nevada counties were included collectively. The topics considered for aesthetics included visual sensitivity of view-sheds, ratings for scenery, and ratings for adjacent land use. The regions of influence included landscapes along candidate rail corridors and highway routes and near possible intermodal facilities, and aesthetics qualities that construction and operations could affect. The ratings were based on the Bureau of Land Management Visual Resource Management System.
Truck volumes are considered based on analyses provided in Section J.1.2 of the EIS. Impact experience for Nevada was considered based on incident rates provided by the State, as discussed in Section J.1.4.2.
In light of the comments received on the Draft EIS concerning perceived risk, DOE examined relevant studies and literature on perceived risk and stigmatization of communities to determine whether the state-of-the-science in predicting future behavior based on perceptions had advanced sufficiently since scoping to allow DOE to quantify the impact of public risk perception on economic development or property values in potentially affected communities (see Section 2.5.4 and Appendix N of the EIS). Of particular interest were those scientific and social studies carried out in the past few years that directly relate to either Yucca Mountain or to DOE actions such as the transportation of foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. DOE reevaluated the conclusions of previous literature reviews such as those conducted by the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board and the State of Nevada, among others. DOE has concluded that:
- While in some instances risk perceptions could result in adverse impacts on portions of a local economy, there are no reliable methods whereby such impacts could be predicted with any degree of certainty
- Much of the uncertainty is irreducible, and
- Based on a qualitative analysis, adverse impacts from perceptions of risk would be unlikely or relatively small.
Based on these analyses, DOE believes that the relationship between a repository and related transportation activities, and subsequent individual behavior is speculative because it does not necessarily depend on actual physical effects on individuals or the public at large. Moreover, the potential indirect effects of the proximity of a repository or of transportation activities on tourism or quality-of-life indicators would vary by individual, cannot be precisely defined, and are not reasonably foreseeable.
However, DOE will continue to work with local communities and tribal nations to understand and mitigate potential negative perceptions of DOE operations. These activities include the development and presentation of factual information regarding the actual (rather than perceived) risks associated with the construction, operation and monitoring, and eventual closure of a repository at Yucca Mountain and related transportation activities.
Given the integrity of the casks transporting the waste, and the fact that more than 2,500 shipments of spent nuclear fuel have been safely transported in the last 25 years with no fatalities, injuries, or environmental damage caused by the radioactive nature of the cargo, the chances of contamination of local communities and the environment from an incident involving this type of waste are extremely unlikely and not expected to occur. DOE believes that this waste can be transported safely.
8.8.2 (4357)
Comment - EIS001157 / 0002
Because Yucca Mountain is about 90 miles north of Las Vegas, the greatest impact to North Las Vegas will be the material transport phase. Specific impacts to North Las Vegas were not sufficiently addressed in the DEIS.
Response
Section 6.3 of the EIS provides DOE’s analysis of transportation routes and their alternatives within Nevada. Note specifically that Table J-48 describes Case 6 that uses the proposed Las Vegas Beltway from Interstate-15 to U.S. 95. DOE used the best information on populations, infrastructure, planned improvements, and incident rates available at the time of the analysis. As part of the basis for the analysis, DOE evaluated Assessment of the Hazards of Transporting Spent Nuclear Fuel and High Level Radioactive Waste to the Proposed Yucca Mountain Repository Using the Proposed Northern Las Vegas Beltway (DIRS 155112-Berger Group 2000), which provided information specific to North Las Vegas.
8.8.2 (4365)
Comment - EIS001157 / 0011
If a rail line is built through the north end of the Las Vegas Valley, grade-separated crossings should be included as part of the project. The air quality and traffic congestion consequences of delaying vehicular traffic through the Las Vegas Valley are understated and mitigation measures need to be identified.
Response
Air quality and traffic congestion due to the operation of a branch rail line northeast of Las Vegas or any of the other branch rail line alternatives would not be a significant problem (see Section 6.3.2.2.5 of the EIS). If DOE used general freight service to transport the shipment to the branch rail line, the spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste railcars would be part of a potentially much larger train with commensurate delays at grade crossings regardless of the addition of a few railcars. However, if DOE chose dedicated rail, the train probably would consist of three to five railcars with little or no traffic buildup at grade crossings. Once the shipment(s) were on the branch rail line, the size of the train would result in little or no traffic buildups. At this time, DOE has not determined the commercial arrangements it would request from railroads for shipment of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
8.8.2 (4370)
Comment - EIS001157 / 0016
The vehicle emission analysis for the Las Vegas Valley was insufficient in two ways. First, it was based only on legal-weight trucks and did not consider the heavy-haul option which will create traffic congestion. Second, the reasoning for assuming only a limited impact was based on I-15 traffic volumes at Sahara Avenue, which is in the center of the City. None of the proposed routes go through this area, so a comparison using a more likely location (such as the permanent traffic recorder near the Apex interchange) should be used.
Response
Section 6.3.3 of the EIS evaluates air quality impacts due to vehicle emissions from heavy-haul trucks. In response to public comments, the EIS contains an expanded discussion of truck emissions in the Las Vegas Valley and the overall impacts on air quality.
8.8.2 (5529)
Comment - EIS001660 / 0039
The DEIS fails to adequately address impacts of the proposed action on existing surface transportation systems in affected Nevada counties. Transportation routes to Yucca Mountain would need to be improved. These routes are important for mining, interstate commerce, and mobility of all affected county residents and visitors. Also, a network of minor roads, mostly unpaved, serves affected county residents by providing access to public lands, private property, and mining claims. The DEIS must analyze and disclose the impacts of the proposed action on the railroad and the main improved highways. Specifically, it must consider: (1) the existing capacities of road and railroad links, in terms of both weight and traffic volume; (2) the anticipated increases in utilization of those links, in terms of weight and volume; (3) the impacts of those increases on rails, pavements, road beds, and travel times; and (4) whether the proposed action would create a need or demand for additional improved routes through affected counties in Nevada. Also, the DEIS must consider the impacts on the nation’s rail transport system of an accident involving SNF [spent nuclear fuel] and HLW [high-level radioactive waste]. In the context of the mostly legal-weight truck scenario, I-80, US 50, NV 278, NV 376 (Lander and Nye Counties), US 6 (White Pine and Nye Counties, which is close to Mineral County), and other Nevada routes could be utilized as main alternate routes for transport of SNF and HLW. The impacts of the proposed action on the existing uses of those routes must be addressed in the DEIS, in addition to I- 15 in southern Nevada. Finally, the DEIS must disclose how access to minor roads would be affected and preserved.
Response
Sections 6.3 and J.3 of the EIS summarize the impacts of both incident-free truck and rail transportation and transportation accidents on Nevada. Section J.3.1 discusses the transportation modes, routes, and number of shipments of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste for the different transportation implementing alternatives and their alignment variations. This information includes tables of information of potential upgrades needed for each option. This information provides the basis for the impact assessments. Details of impacts on existing surface transportation were evaluated in the following reference documents and summarized in the EIS. Impacts to traffic levels and road structures were evaluated in Road Upgrades for Heavy Haul Truck Routes (DIRS 154448-CRWMS M&O 1998); impacts to existing roads (paved and unpaved) were analyzed in Rail Alignments Analysis (DIRS 131242-CRWMS M&O 1997) where it was proposed to provide grade separations at major roads and at grade crossings at necessary minor roads. These analyses evaluated current traffic levels on existing roads, estimated increased traffic, and additional traffic due to spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste transport.
When a corridor or route was selected, detailed assessments and designs for rail alignments or heavy-haul truck road upgrades would be initiated. These studies would be part of engineering and environmental studies needed to develop detailed designs and to support specific National Environmental Policy Act reviews for the proposed actions. DOE would use routes that meet U.S. Department of Transportation requirements or routes designated by state or tribal routing agencies.
8.8.2 (6221)
Comment - EIS001904 / 0001
The primary concern of Elko County is for the health, safety, and welfare of it citizens. The draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) regarding the transportation of 70,000 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste through this county to connect a new railroad spur in Beowawe is not an acceptable transportation alternative. The Draft fails to address a host of concerns that this alternative might bring to Northern Nevada if this plan is accepted into the final EIS. The Draft is flawed because it has several transportation routes and methods of transport yet does not address the impacts or effects that would be incurred by these different scenarios.
The Carlin potential rail corridor alternative fails to address the fact that to get this new spur, the existing Union Pacific Rail Way lines will be used. This heavily used rail system will be furthered burdened by at least three to four of these radioactive waste trains traveling these lines each week for the next 24 years. The Draft EIS does not address the shared use of these rail lines that are also used for shipment of commercial explosives, military weapons and munitions, petroleum products, and other hazardous materials. [Nowhere] is the safety and environmental impacts considered in this Draft. The Department of Energy calls for shipping rail casks loaded with highly radioactive spent fuel in general freight trains and would require switching cars at the connection point thereby routinely parking loaded rail cask cars on side track for up to 48 hours. Further, most of the spent fuel is from the east and Midwest and if this rail line was used, these trains would pass through our most populous cities, namely Wells, Elko, and Carlin. The city of Elko is where the trains on this rail line change crews and it would follow that a crew change would be required for the radioactive waste trains as well in Elko, with a population 17,000 and an additional 10,000 people within 20 miles. [Nowhere] in the Draft EIS is our County mentioned as a potentially impacted area. There are no provisions for any type of Hazardous Material training for our emergency response personnel and no provisions for financial assistance if we were to be subjected to radiological disaster. The mention of upgrading of the existing rail lines as well as signalization upgrades, grade crossing or Right of way fencing is nonexistent in the Draft EIS.
Response
The EIS presents safety and environmental impacts (see Chapter 6 and Appendix J) of 10 implementing alternatives for transportation in Nevada by rail or heavy-haul truck including the construction of a branch rail line from Beowawe to Yucca Mountain. In addition, the use of legal-weight truck in Nevada is analyzed, including the sensitivity analysis of six alternative legal-weight truck routes. The analysis includes both construction-related impacts and operational impacts (including transportation of materials to the repository). As the analysis indicates, the impacts would be small regardless of which alternative was chosen. This indicates that impacts along any specific route and through any specific community would be small. In addition, the EIS presents an analysis of a generic community along the transportation route that indicates that community specific impacts would be small.
Decisions regarding the selection of a branch rail line for transporting spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste have not been made. However, it is in DOE’s interest and in the interest of communities along a branch rail line to consider shared use of the line. This could involve shipments of other materials to Yucca Mountain, the Nevada Test Site, or shared usage with commercial interests. Before decisions would be made on the transportation alternatives associated with the Yucca Mountain Repository, the impacts such as shared use, would be evaluated. The specific conditions of any railway would be analyzed once specific decisions were made and potential upgrades implemented.
As requested, DOE would assist the State, tribal, and local governments in several ways to reduce the consequences of accidents related to the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. In addition, under Section 180(c) of the NWPA, DOE would provide technical assistance and funding to train State, local, and tribal public safety officials in safe transport procedures and emergency response. More details about the Section 180(c) process are provided in Appendix M of the EIS.
8.8.2 (6708)
Comment - EIS001878 / 0072
The DEIS fails to adequately address the impacts of the proposed action on existing surface transportation systems in Eureka County and other counties in Nevada. Interstate 80, US 50, NV 278, and NV 306 are the main improved routes in Eureka County. They are important routes for mining, interstate commerce, and the mobility of County residents and visitors. The Union Pacific railroad generally parallels I-80 and the Humboldt River across the northern portion of the County. It is an essential component of the transportation network for interstate commerce and national defense. A network of minor roads also serves the residents of Eureka County, providing access to public lands, private property, and mining claims.
Principal transportation routes. The DEIS must analyze and disclose the impacts of the proposed action on the railroad and the main improved highways. Specifically, it must consider: (1) the existing capacities of road and railroad links, in terms of both weight and traffic volume, (2) the anticipated increases in utilization of those links, in terms of weight and volume, (3) the impacts of those increases on rails, pavements, road beds, and travel times, and (4) whether the proposed action would create a need or demand for additional improved routes through Eureka County.
Eureka County is especially concerned that utilization of the main Union Pacific tracks and facilities in the northern county could involve the storage of rail cars carrying SNF [spent nuclear fuel] and HLW [high-level radioactive waste] on sidings near Beowawe for extended periods of time. The impacts of such storage on transcontinental rail operations and on existing sidings in the vicinity (including those at Carlin and Dunphy) must be considered. In addition, the DEIS must consider the impacts upon the nation’s rail transport system of an accident involving SNF and HLW and one of the UP bridges over the Humboldt River.
Alternative routes. In the context of the mostly legal-weight truck scenario, I-80, US 50, NV 278, NV 376 (in Lander and Nye Counties), US 6 (in White Pine and Nye Counties), and other Nevada routes could be utilized as main or alternate routes for the transport of SNF and HLW. The impacts of the proposed action on the existing uses of those routes must be addressed in the DEIS, in addition to I-15 in southern Nevada. Among other information, the DEIS must disclose the alternative routes that would be used, and the anticipated impacts along those routes, when rail or legal-weight truck operations are interrupted by flooding, range fires, and other natural events.
R.S. 2477 roads and other access routes. Rights of way over public lands for many roads were granted by Section 8 of chapter 262, 14 Statutes 253 (former 43 U.S.C. Sec. 932, commonly referred to as R.S. 2477) enacted in 1866. Such roads serve the public interest; provide access for fire control, law enforcement, search and rescue, medical personnel, and public utilities; provide access to public lands for members of the general public; and enhance the taxable value of the private property they serve.
Eureka County is concerned that many R.S. 2477 roads and other roads along the proposed Carlin corridor may be affected by construction of the roadbed, access roads, and fences. The DEIS must disclose: (1) whether the proposed action would result in the closing of any of these roads, (2) whether it would restrict access to them in any way, and (3) how the proposed action would ensure the continuity of such roads, through the use of at-grade crossings, underpasses, overpasses, or other means. Subsection 1 of Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 405.204 authorizes Nevada’s attorney general to bring an action for declaratory judgment against an agency of the United States responsible for the lands over which an accessory road runs that pursues the closing of an accessory road or demands a fee or permit for its use.
Response
The current rail traffic on existing rail lines within Nevada is large (approximately 1,000 railcars per day) compared to the railcars per week that could be expected with spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste destined for Yucca Mountain. The increase in rail traffic would have little or no impact on the existing rail infrastructure. DOE has identified rail as its preferred mode of transportation within Nevada. It is not expected that the construction of a branch rail line would affect R.S. 2477 roads and other roads along the candidate rail corridors.
The incident-free transportation analysis considers the stop of railcars in classification yards throughout its journey from origin to destination. These classification stops are assumed to occur once in the state of origin, once in the state of destination, and a number of times in between depending on the number of kilometers traveled. The population density at each of the stops is conservatively assumed to be a suburban population zone (719 persons per square kilometer). Therefore, any layover of railcars in Nevada while awaiting transfer to a train for travel to Yucca Mountain has been addressed in the EIS.
The accident analysis in the EIS considered the impacts of low probability severe accidents. If an accident was severe enough to require closing the railroad track at the location of the accident, alternative routing measures could be employed to circumvent the area of the accident.
For the mostly legal-weight truck scenario in Nevada, the analysis looked at the routing according to U.S. Department of Transportation routing regulations and analyzed the impacts of six alternative legal-weight truck routes. The analysis indicated that there were not significant differences in impacts across the legal-weight truck routing alternatives.
Following are responses to the three specific requests for disclosure:
- The closing of specific roads is not anticipated although specific routes have not been defined.
- Specific access to these roads has not been designed but access is not expected to be restricted.
- The continuity of these roads would be determined by DOE and the State using the route/mode decision process.
8.8.2 (7011)
Comment - EIS001887 / 0140
Page 2-81; Section 2.4.4.2 - Nevada Transportation
The Draft EIS states, "With the exception of Land Use, differences in environmental impacts for the ten implementing alternatives related to incoming shipments by rail would be small, so environmental impacts do not appear to be a major factor in the selection of transportation mode, route, or corridor in Nevada for incoming rail shipments." This statement is inaccurate. Rail operations associated with heavy-haul shipments present major problems for the operational highway network in Nevada. The Draft EIS ignores such impacts as traffic queuing, failing structural sections, remedial actions for reducing traffic accidents, and institutional anomalies (such as providing a portable crane capable of lifting overturned vehicles and casks).
Response
As discussed in Section J.3.1.2 of the EIS, several highway upgrades would be proposed for any of the five heavy-haul truck implementing alternatives. There is a table listing and describing the upgrades proposed for each route. Nevada highways upgraded for heavy-haul truck use would include new truck turnout lanes at frequent intervals along two-lane highways to allow other traffic to pass the slower heavy-haul vehicles in order to reduce traffic queuing. A detailed analysis of structural sections, remedial actions for reducing traffic accidents, and institutional anomalies would be conducted in subsequent engineering and environmental analyses once a mode and route were selected. As a part of these studies, government agency consultation and appropriate National Environmental Policy Act reviews would be conducted. In addition, as a part of the permitting process, the State Engineer may, as necessary, conduct an engineering evaluation (including a structural analysis) of the proposed heavy-haul truck route according to Nevada Administrative Code Chapter 484.530. Cranes and equipment used for non-NWPA rail incidents could handle NWPA equipment, including casks.
8.8.2 (7043)
Comment - EIS001160 / 0044
It is very difficult within the DEIS to evaluate impact on communities in the major zone of influence. One is hard pressed to find any quantification of how many actual legal weight truck haul loads could be expected through Ely on the US 93 or SR 318 scenario. The table on J-7 might indicate around 1500 shipments from the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory 800 shipments from Hanford that might use a route through Ely as an alternate to Interstate routes, spread over a 20-year period (Table J-4). It would be useful if there was analysis of some key points like Ely (apparently a relatively low impact area with about 350 shipments of high-level radioactive waste a year, Table J-4) as opposed to perhaps high impact Mesquite with perhaps an average of 1700 shipments a year of commercial spent nuclear fuel (Figure J-10).
Response
As described in Section 2.1.3.2 of the EIS, the Department describes the national transportation scenarios and provides maps of the Interstate Highway System and the national rail system. Under the Proposed Action, DOE would ship spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from 72 commercial and 5 DOE sites in some combination of legal-weight truck, rail, heavy-haul truck, and possibly barge. Because DOE cannot anticipate the exact number of shipments and mode that would be used, the EIS considers two transportation scenarios, a mostly legal-weight truck scenario and a mostly rail scenario, in order to illustrate the broadest range of operating conditions relevant to potential impacts to human health and the environment (see Table 2-2 of the EIS).
In addition to analyzing the impacts of using highway routes that would meet U.S. Department of Transportation requirements for transporting spent nuclear fuel (49 CFR Part 397), DOE evaluated how the estimated impacts would differ if legal-weight trucks used other routes in Nevada, including representative routes that would pass through the community of Ely (see Table J-47 of the EIS). This analysis was made for the range of operating conditions illustrated in the mostly legal-weight truck scenario and the mostly rail scenario (see Section J.3.1.3). Under the range of operating conditions, DOE assumed that all legal-weight shipments would travel along the given routes under each of the scenarios. The results of this analysis can be found in Table J-48, which indicates the variations in impacts between various Nevada routes. The impacts to the community of Ely would be a small fraction of the impacts to Nevada. In response to public comments on the Draft EIS, DOE has included an analysis for a maximally exposed individual of a small community in Section 6.3. Section J.4 contains maps of each state where shipments would originate or through which they would pass. Each state map lists the number of shipments used in the analysis and the impacts within the state of such shipments.
DOE expects that the mostly rail scenario best represents the mix of truck and rail transportation modes it would use. To determine this mix, DOE considered whether sites are able to handle larger (rail) casks, distances to suitable railheads, and historic precedent in actual shipments of fuel, waste or other large reactor-related components. DOE also has considered relevant information published by knowledgeable sources such as the Nuclear Energy Institute and the State of Nevada. The analysis has confirmed DOE’s belief that the mostly legal-weight truck and mostly rail scenarios provide the range (lower and upper bound) of environmental impacts from the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
8.8.2 (7141)
Comment - EIS001337 / 0038
The County [Lincoln] and City [Caliente] recommended that an assessment of paleontologic resources within alternative rail corridors and at potential borrow pit sites within Lincoln County be conducted and reported on within the scope of the repository DEIS. The DEIS does not identify potential borrow pits and therefor has not included an assessment of the paleontologic resources at such sites. Such an omission makes the document less useful as a decision-support tool, particularly in choosing among transportation corridor alternatives.
Response
As stated in Section 6.3 of the EIS, the evaluation of impacts of cultural resources considered the potential for disrupting or modifying the character of archaeological or historic sites, artifacts, and other cultural resources. The region of influence for the analysis included the lands in the 400-meter (0.25-mile)-wide rail corridors. Cultural resource impacts of each rail corridor implementing alternative are provided in Section 6.3.2.2. Should the mostly rail transportation scenario be selected and a preferred corridor identified, additional engineering and environmental studies would be initiated to select a specific alignment of the tracks within the selected corridor. Appropriate National Environmental Policy Act reviews would be conducted to support selection of a specific alignment and design. Borrow pits would not be identified and assessed for cultural resources until geotechnical surveys and other environmental studies were conducted in conjunction with subsequent design activities following the selection of a rail corridor or intermodal transfer station location. An assessment of paleontologic resources at borrow pits would be included in such National Environmental Policy Act reviews for the specific rail alignment.
8.8.2 (7521)
Comment - EIS001912 / 0050
Section 3.2.2.1. Did any member of the EIS team make site visits and site investigations for the various rail corridor alternatives? If yes, please explain the nature of the investigations?
Response
Section 3.2.2.1 of the EIS is based on a combination of published information and field observations. Based on published environmental data, 54 springs, perennial streams, and Bureau of Land Management-designated riparian areas were visited by DOE biologists to determine if those sites contain wetlands (DIRS 155378-Reilly and Smith 1997). Fifteen locations with sensitive species were visited to ensure that the sites still had suitable habitat for the species (DIRS 154825-CRWMS M&O 1997). In addition, DOE engineers made an initial visual survey of all rail corridor alternatives as a part of the routing analysis. Topography, land use, and known areas of environmental concern were observed as a part of the corridor centerline selection to minimize impacts to stakeholders (DIRS 131242-CRWMS M&O 1997). Cultural resources, noise, aesthetics, and existing visual conditions were observed by contractor personnel on a field trip along proposed heavy-haul truck routes and rail corridors. Additional interviews with responsible State and Federal agencies were conducted and additional literature searches were performed during the trip. A report has been prepared detailing the information obtained during the trip (DIRS 155826-Nickens and Hartwell 2001) and the relevant information is included in Chapter 6 of the EIS.
8.8.2 (8725)
Comment - EIS002119 / 0010
And last, I’d like to mention that should there be an incident, even if the routes do not go through Clark County, under certain governmental agreements, we do provide as a large county with a number of resources assistance to other counties, nearby counties in the event of hazardous materials or nuclear materials or waste incidents. And lastly, I’d like to say that this community, Clark County and its urban areas especially and rural areas has been built up from the desert. We have developed. There have been the talents and skills and efforts of a number of people, many of whom have testified here. This has value. There’s value in the quality of life. There’s value economically. There’s value for the future. And these have not been given serious consideration in the DEIS.
Response
Section 180(c) of the NWPA requires DOE to provide technical assistance and funds to state, local, and tribal governments to support training of public safety officials to help ensure safe routine transportation and emergency response for shipments to a repository. The state could provide funds allocated under Section 180(c) to support a county providing assistance to other jurisdictions through mutual aid agreements. Appendix M of the EIS contains more information on Section 180(c).
8.8.2 (9431)
Comment - EIS001593 / 0002
You have got several railroads that would go to this Yucca Mountain, proposed possible railroads, and one of them, this Chalk Mountain or Caliente Chalk Mountain Route, I believe is what it’s called, would go through the Air Force’s Flying Saucer Base out in Nevada.
Now, I don’t know if it is so much interesting from an environmental standpoint, but you know, we hear a lot about this rogue agency, you’ve heard some today about this rogue agency, rogue power behind nuclear power, the Nuclear Power Industry. Well, I am, actually a little more worried about this black operation crowd out there in Nevada, and I would just love to see a knock-down, drag-out fight between the two of you.
Now that would be -- I think that could really open up -- you know, people wonder, you know, if this isn’t some kind of military coup, I mean, all this secret stuff, and wondering, you know, if elected officials are really in control.
Response
DOE reevaluated whether the Caliente-Chalk Mountain Corridor and the Caliente/Chalk Mountain heavy-haul truck route should be eliminated from further evaluation. DOE met with the Air Force (see Appendix C of the EIS), considered the information provided, and concluded that the Caliente-Chalk Mountain Corridor and the Caliente/Chalk Mountain heavy-haul truck route implementing alternatives should remain identified as "nonpreferred alternatives" in this Final EIS.
DOE has not identified a particular rail corridor or heavy-haul truck route as "environmentally preferable." If the site was approved and a mode of transportation (rail or heavy-haul truck in Nevada) was selected in a Record of Decision, DOE would then identify an environmentally preferable corridor or route in a subsequent Record of Decision to select a rail corridor or heavy-haul truck route. In making such a determination, DOE would consider a variety of environmental factors, including many raised by the commenters. The potential environmental impacts from the construction and operation of the Caliente-Chalk Mountain Corridor and the Caliente/Chalk Mountain heavy-haul truck route are included in Sections 6.3.2.2.3and 6.3.3.2.2 of the EIS.
8.8.2 (9607)
Comment - EIS001888 / 0279
An analysis of the risks and impacts of the heavy haul transportation routes through urban Clark County. This analysis should examine the traffic impact of the transportation as well as the risks of this unprecedented program. The engineering data should be modified to include the costs to acquire right of way for the additional travel lanes. The report should also include an estimate of the costs to improve existing infrastructure to accommodate the transportation program.
Response
DOE analyzed heavy-haul truck implementing alternatives in EIS Section 6.3.3, including routes through Clark County. In this analysis, DOE assumed that heavy-haul truck shipments in Clark County would utilize the planned Las Vegas Beltway. In doing so, DOE assumed that funding would be made available to accelerate Beltway Phase II construction to meet a 2010 transport date. DOE used the best available cost estimate for Beltway Phase II construction, taken from the Environmental Study for the Northern and Western Las Vegas Beltway Transportation Facilities and Right-of-Way Footprint (DIRS 103710-Clark County 1997). Costs to acquire right-of-way for additional travel lanes and costs to improve existing Nevada highway infrastructure to accommodate a heavy-haul truck transportation campaign are included in the Department’s cost estimate (DIRS 154675-Ahmer 1998). However, Interstate System highways, and the Las Vegas Beltway after Phase II construction, would not need improvement because they meet, or will meet, standards necessary to sustain heavy-haul truck shipments.
8.8.2 (9664)
Comment - EIS002074 / 0008
With respect to the intermodal sites that was stated in the American Indian prospectus on the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project that was done by the American Indian Writers subgroup, there’s been no systemic ethnographic interviews that have been conducted to evaluate the epidemiological and sociological impacts to Indian people and their communities regarding cultural resources of sacred sites. The studies only focus on the impacts to the physical artifacts and no subsistence patterns, no traditional eligibility for traditional cultural properties or cultural landscape as considered in the bulletin number 30 and 38 by the National Park Service.
Response
Section 3.2.2.1.5 of the EIS discusses the existing, documented information on cultural resources along the candidate rail corridors. Limited field surveys were conducted (DIRS 155826-Nickens and Hartwell 2001). Should the mostly rail transportation scenario be selected and a preferred corridor identified, additional engineering and environmental studies would be initiated to select a specific alignment. During this process, specific data-gathering efforts and analyses would be conducted, including focused cultural resource studies and Native American consultations, as well as consultations with responsible State and Federal agencies, as applicable. Appropriate National Environmental Policy Act reviews would be conducted to support selection of a specific alignment and design.
8.8.2 (9671)
Comment - EIS002074 / 0016
With health and safety, and this is just going down on the record, is that there is concern by this group of terrorism and felt that the potential of those kind of situations occurring, as well as looking at the potential of derailments. It was felt that there was an accident that happened, I believe it was December 24th in 1997 or 1998, on the Caliente, that that was not felt that it was adequately considered or there was an indication as to how those kinds of things could occur -- I mean, how those kinds of things were considered into the decisions of looking at various sites, including the Caliente intermodal site.
Response
In the Final EIS, DOE estimated that the greatest consequences would occur if the sabotage event occurred in the center of a highly populated metropolitan area. The dose from such an event to a maximally exposed individual (about 110 rem over the person’s lifetime) would increase his or her lifetime risk of a fatal cancer from about 23 percent to about 28 percent. However, doses to most affected individuals would be much lower than that to the maximally exposed individual; these individuals’ increased risk of a latent fatal cancer would also be lower. It was not predicted that there would be any prompt fatalities from very high levels of exposure, and immediate health consequences from radiation exposure would be unlikely, but by combining the large number of small individual risks in the population of a metropolitan area, DOE estimated that a sabotage event could lead to as many as 48 latent fatal cancers. Although not estimated in the analysis, injuries and deaths from blast effects of a device that might be used would be expected for individuals who would be as close to the event as the hypothesized maximally exposed individual. However, exposure to radioactive materials sufficient to lead to an individual lifetime dose of 110 rem could result in a need for medical attention. DOE designed the analyses to identify the maximum consequences that a severe accident could reasonably be expected to produce (reasonably expected is defined as a likelihood greater than, but on the order of, 1 in 10 million in a year), but the analysis did not make extreme assumptions that would identify the worst possible consequences that could be imagined.
DOE believes that a shipment of spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste would be an unlikely target in part due to the physical security measures imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations. Under certain conditions, armed escorts would either follow or ride in the truck cab or an escort railcar. DOE would monitor its spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste shipments through a satellite-based tracking system.
8.8.2 (9771)
Comment - EIS001160 / 0123
The use of conventional highway traffic data, while convenient may have limited applicability when examining scenarios within White Pine County.
Response
The highway traffic data used to estimate impacts on the highways within Nevada are representative of the types of trucks that would be utilized to transport spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste within Nevada. National, State, and regional traffic data were used to ensure that transportation analyses were representative. Reviewing the references for Section 6 and Appendix J of the EIS shows the breadth and depth of traffic data used.
8.8.2 (10232)
Comment - EIS002115 / 0007
Other transportation issues of the waste to the site are: Mode, not clearly identified. Three possible modes of transportation are identified.
The waste could be driven on interstates using legal weight trucks. It could be sent by train, which includes five options of building a railroad to Yucca Mountain. It could be transported by heavy-haul, which is rail to a transfer point in Nevada, then transferred to 220 foot heavy-haul trucks and transported to Yucca Mountain. Routing, many possible routes not studied adequately. Rural areas do not have good or safe roads to transport this nuclear waste, especially if alternative routes are selected, nor do they have railroads to get it to Yucca Mountain. Land use. Consideration of present and planned land uses along possible routes identified.
Response
DOE used current regulations governing highway shipments and historic rail industry practices to select existing highway and rail routes to estimate potential environmental impacts. These routes are representative of the routes that the Department could use to transport spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to Yucca Mountain. Section J.3.1.2 of the EIS discusses the rail implementing alternatives, which are the five candidate rail routes in Nevada to Yucca Mountain.
In addition, Section J.3.1.3 of the EIS describes the sensitivity of the impact analysis to the routing assumptions. With regard to land-use impacts, Sections 6.1.2.1 and J.3 discuss land-use impacts associated with the transportation implementing alternatives. If DOE selected a specific alternative, it would complete a more detailed analysis of environmental, engineering, and socioeconomic impacts along the corridor.
8.8.2 (10770)
Comment - EIS002144 / 0007
The Department of Energy operations office puts you guys to shame. They’ve done studies that we’ve told them to do. They came to us last year says, "Hey, we got studies this thick about intermodal transportation to the Nevada Test Site." We did an EA on it -- on the same thing that they had. They had $350,000.00. We had ten days to do this and about a hundred dollars a day per person to do it. When we got finished, our document was five times bigger. Our document talked about transportation. How are you going to get it there? How is it going to get there in the first place. And then after that, what’s going to happen?
Our document talked about a lot farther than a half mile, because our document talked about real life. When -- when a crow flies in, he’s not coming in just from a half mile; he’s coming in from many miles away, and every time he goes to the bathroom, he drops that radiated part out of his body. Coyotes don’t just come from a half mile away. Eagles don’t just come from half mile away. They all come from a lot farther, and they don’t consider that because they say -- and they’re right. I’m not a scientific person. I know from my experience at home and my teachings from my people what we -- what has happened and what is going to happen, and it’s a shame that we -- that I have to cry and scream and yell just like you at your site and go home.
Response
The analysis of impacts from the construction and operation of an intermodal transfer station in Section J.3.3.1 of the EIS indicated that there are no credible accidents that would result in a release of radioactive material. The analysis evaluated radiological and nonradiological impacts and found that they would be low.
8.8.2 (11277)
Comment - EIS001814 / 0011
DEIS Page 2-9
DOE is looking at three transportation scenarios for Nevada. These scenarios include legal-weight truck and rail, which are the same as the national scenarios but highlight the Nevada portion of the transportation, and heavy-haul truck.
Although DOE maintains that the "mostly legal weight truck" and "mostly rail" scenarios adequately bound the analysis for the national transportation scenarios, this is not true for the Nevada Transportation Scenarios. Under the "mostly legal weight truck" scenario, DOE must still deal with more than 300 rail shipments of high-level waste and Naval fuel (references). The Nevada Transportation Scenario fails to describe how DOE will deal with these shipments without either constructing a rail line or operating an intermodal transfer site and heavy-haul.
Response
Section 2.1.3.3.1 of the EIS states that DOE would use heavy-haul trucks and would establish an intermodal transfer capability. These 300 shipments would be spread over a 24-year period, which would arrive within Nevada by rail. Section 6.3.3 states, "This EIS assumed that DOE would not build an intermodal transfer station to handle those shipments." The intermodal transfer capability would consist of a suitable crane and an existing rail siding suitable for transferring the transportation cask (approximately 12 per year) onto a heavy-haul truck described in Figure 2-28. In this limited heavy-haul truck scenario, there would be no road upgrades required as described in this section for the mostly rail scenario. Nevada Department of Transportation currently issues approximately 400 permits on a single-trip permit basis for vehicles capable of transporting 68 metric tons (75 tons) or more payload on the five candidate heavy-haul truck routes evaluated in the EIS, excluding the use of the Las Vegas Beltway. DOE believes that the 12 additional heavy-haul truck shipments per year on these roads would not warrant large-scale, costly highway improvements that are included in the mostly rail scenario, nor would they cause significant additional highway deterioration or traffic hazards.
8.8.2 (11278)
Comment - EIS001814 / 0012
DEIS Page 2-40
These scenarios illustrate the broadest range of operating conditions relevant to potential impacts to human health and environment.
This statement is incorrect, since the "Mostly LWT [legal-weight truck]" scenario includes rail shipments. Without constructing a new rail line in Nevada or operating an intermodal transfer and heavy-haul in Nevada, the shipments dependant on rail will either have to be repackaged in smaller containers in Nevada or not shipped to the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain.
Response
As described in Section 2.1.3.2.1 of the EIS, part of the mostly legal-weight truck scenario includes the shipment of naval spent nuclear fuel that would be shipped to Nevada by rail. These shipments incorporate approximately 300 shipments over a 24-year operational period. The EIS assumed that these shipments would use the services of a commercial intermodal operator. The EIS also assumed that DOE would not build an intermodal transfer station to handle naval spent nuclear fuel shipments. Naval spent nuclear fuel shipments, equating to approximately 16 casks per year, would then be shipped from the intermodal transfer point to Yucca Mountain by heavy-haul truck as described in Section 6.3.3.1. It is the Department’s opinion that the EIS adequately analyzes the mostly legal-weight truck transportation shipping scenario.
8.8.2 (11285)
Comment - EIS001814 / 0017
DEIS Page 2-49
Construction activities would include the development of construction support areas; construction of access roads to the rail line construction initiation points and to major structures to be built, such as bridges; and movement of equipment to the construction initiation points. The number and location of construction initiation points would be based on such variables as the route selected, the length of the line, the construction schedule, the number of contractors used for construction, the number of structures to be built, and the locations of existing access roads adjacent to the rail line.
The construction activities listed cannot be completed without some environmental impact, and will require appropriate mitigative measures. Without a detailed description of these activities it is impossible to conclude that they can be completed without causing unacceptable adverse environmental impacts, even with mitigative measures. Until these construction activities are specified, DOE cannot conclude that the proposed action will not result in unacceptable impacts as required by the National Environmental Policy Act.
Response
Section 6.3 of the EIS describes different categories of environmental information acquired and evaluated for Nevada transportation. The results of the evaluation of this information for each mode and route in Nevada are provided in the subsequent sections. Should the mostly rail transportation scenario be selected and a preferred corridor identified, additional engineering and environmental studies would be initiated to select a specific alignment of the tracks within the selected corridor and related construction activities. Appropriate National Environmental Policy Act reviews would be conducted to support selection of a specific alignment and design. Detailed branch rail line construction activities would be evaluated in subsequent engineering and environmental analyses in conjunction with government agency consultation and evaluated in appropriate National Environmental Policy Act reviews conducted in union with these analyses and consultations. Access roads and construction support areas would be evaluated as short-term temporary impacts.
8.8.2 (11286)
Comment - EIS001814 / 0018
DEIS Page 2-50
Railroad track construction would consist of the placement of railbed material, ties, rail, and ballast (support and stabilizing materials for the rail ties) over the completed railbed platform.
Construction of the railroad in any of the proposed rail corridors will require significant quantities of ballast and probably significant quantities of sub-ballast. The EIS does not provide a description of the source for these materials. The quantity of ballast and sub-ballast required should be accurately defined, and sources for the material described. Quarrying the ballast and sub-ballast could result in significant environmental impacts not assessed in the EIS.
Response
Detailed evaluations for the source of sub-ballast, ballast, and fill materials would be performed in subsequent National Environmental Policy Act evaluations, should rail be selected as the preferred mode for transportation. Determination of material sources is very route-specific, and the detailed engineering required to develop accurate source requirements is more applicable to the next level of National Environmental Policy Act activities, once a route had been selected. Preliminary quantities of fill material, sub-ballast, and ballast were evaluated in Nevada Transportation Study Construction Cost Estimate (DIRS 154822-CRWMS M&O 1998).
The estimated land disturbance for obtaining fill materials was included in the land disturbance quantities in the EIS. The ballast and sub-ballast materials were assumed to be available from existing quarries, either in Nevada or from quarries in neighboring states. Sub-ballast and ballast materials could be transported to the rail construction site by completed rail section. Therefore, the transportation of those materials from quarries in other parts of the country is not a great economic differentiation, unlike the transportation of the base fill materials that would have to be transported by truck. Fill material transport would a significant cost driver, which would require the use of local borrow sources. This is why the EIS includes fill borrow source disturbed land and not sub-ballast and ballast borrow source estimates.
8.8.2 (11287)
Comment - EIS001814 / 0019
DEIS Page 2-50
Other activities would include the following: Installation of fences along the rail line, if requested by other agencies (for example, the Bureau of Land Management or the Fish and Wildlife Service).
The description of the proposed action should include the location and type of fencing to be installed. Without this information, it is not possible to assess the impacts of the proposed action, particularly on wildlife and on land use. The two agencies listed could, in fact, request conflicting requirements for fencing based upon the impact within their area of jurisdiction. Depending on the types and locations of fencing, the proposed action could create significant impacts to wildlife, particularly where the proposed corridors cross critical habitat areas.
Response
Section 6.3 of the EIS addresses the potential needs for fencing under the categories of land use and ownership and biological resources, and identifies potential impacts. Should the mostly rail transportation scenario be selected and a preferred corridor identified, additional engineering and environmental studies would be initiated to select a specific alignment of the tracks within the selected corridor. Appropriate National Environmental Policy Act reviews would be conducted to support selection of a specific alignment and design. Detailed analysis of fencing locations and types would be evaluated in subsequent engineering and environmental analyses and government agency consultation and evaluated in appropriate National Environmental Policy Act reviews conducted in conjunction with these analyses and consultations. It is the Department’s opinion that the EIS adequately analyzes potential needs for fencing along candidate railroads and roadways, and their use and impacts.
8.8.2 (11288)
Comment - EIS001814 / 0020
DEIS Page 2-50
This EIS assumes there would be about four trains per week for shipments of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to the repository. In addition, the rail line would enable the transport of other material to the repository, including empty disposal containers, bulk concrete materials, steel, large equipment, and general building materials. The EIS assumes one train per week for this other material for a total of about five trains per week to the repository from about 2010 to 2033.
The EIS does not include an estimate of the number of trains leaving the repository. This would presumably include return of empty shipping casks as well as additional unloaded cars that were used to ship materials to the site. One cannot automatically assume that the number of unloaded trains leaving the repository will be the same as the number of loaded trains arriving. Therefore, it is not possible to assess the impacts of the rail line from the description of the proposed action.
Although discussed in the references to the EIS, this EIS does not discuss the different options for ownership and operation of the rail line or the possibility that the rail line would be used for other purposes than the proposed action described in the EIS. Use for other types of shipments could increase the impacts of the proposed action above that is described in the EIS.
Response
All transportation in the EIS is considered to be round-trip. Therefore, the transportation discussed in the comment (the return trip from the repository) is addressed in the EIS. Section 8.4.2 of the EIS discusses the shared use of a branch rail line. Decisions regarding the selection of a branch rail line for transporting spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste have not been made. However, it is in DOE’s interest and in the interest of communities along a branch rail line to consider shared use. Before decisions were made on the transportation alternatives associated with the Yucca Mountain Repository, the impacts, such as shared use, would be evaluated. In addition, the NWPA, through its section on consultation and cooperation, requires DOE to consult with affected units of local government. Potential benefits of the shared use of the branch rail line would be explored through that process.
8.8.2 (11293)
Comment - EIS001814 / 0022
DEIS Page 2-51
Intermodal transfer station operations would depend on whether the railcars that carried spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste arrived on dedicated or general freight trains.
DOE states that there will be operational differences for the intermodal transfer station between the dedicated train and general freight options. The EIS, however, does not contain sufficient information on these differences to allow an evaluation of the difference in impacts between the two options. The difference between staging requirements for the heavy-haul vehicles for the two options should be described. If general freight was used, the EIS states that the "General freight trains would switch from the main Union Pacific track to an existing or newly constructed passing track." The EIS does not state where the existing or newly constructed passing track would be located. If it is located at the intermodal transfer station, this would significantly alter the design of the station. If a new passing track is constructed at a location independent of the station, this would create potential impacts that have not been evaluated. Even if an "existing passing track" is used, this would probably require the Union Pacific to construct a new passing track for other railroad traffic.
Response
Table J-25 in the EIS presents a comparison of general freight and dedicated rail service. However, available information has not indicated a clear overall advantage of using general freight or dedicated rail service for the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. At this time DOE has not determined the commercial arrangements (dedicated or regular freight) it would request from railroads for shipment of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Once that determination was made, the logistics of transporting the railcar(s) would be discussed with the rail carriers, states, tribes, and other stakeholders.
8.8.2 (11296)
Comment - EIS001814 / 0025
DEIS Page 2-54
Most borrow material for construction could come from existing Nevada Department of Transportation borrow areas, if the State agreed.
Most road design projects attempt to balance cut and fill requirements during construction of the roads. Therefore, it is not reasonable to assume that borrow material will be available in existing borrow areas for the extensive fill requirements necessary to construct truck climbing lanes and other road improvements. Obtaining fill material from other areas could result in significant impacts not discussed within the EIS.
Response
Section J.3.1 of the EIS discusses the transportation modes, routes, and number of shipments of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste for the different transportation implementing alternatives and their alignment variations. This information includes tables of information of potential upgrades needed for each option. This information provides the basis for the impact assessments. Details of impacts on existing surface transportation was evaluated in CRWMS M&O (DIRS 154448-1998) and summarized in the EIS. These analyses evaluated current traffic levels on existing roads, estimated increased traffic, and additional traffic due to spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste transport.
Costs estimated for the road upgrades associated with the heavy-haul truck transportation systems assumed that fill material would be hauled in from existing borrow areas. If the State’s current borrow areas were insufficient to provide the material needed, the fill would be obtained from existing private borrow sources or quarries.
When a corridor or route was selected, detailed assessments and designs for rail alignments or heavy-haul truck road upgrades would be initiated. These studies would be part of engineering and environmental studies needed to develop detailed designs and to support appropriate National Environmental Policy Act reviews for the proposed actions. DOE would use routes that meet U.S. Department of Transportation requirements or were designated by State routing agencies.
8.8.2 (11304)
Comment - EIS001814 / 0033
DEIS Page 3-100
DOE expects waste quantities generated by rail line construction and operation to be minor in comparison to those from repository construction and operation. As such, no discussion of existing waste disposal infrastructure along the routes is provided.
It is true that waste quantities generated by rail line construction and operation should be minor in comparison to those from repository construction and operation. The comparison, however, is meaningless. Most of the rail construction would take place far from the repository, much of it in remote, sparsely populated areas. Waste generated during the rail construction will undoubtedly not be hauled to the same disposal site as waste generated during repository construction. Rather, it will be disposed in facilities along the corridor.
What is significant, therefore, is the volume and type of waste generated by rail line construction and operation in comparison to the capacity of waste disposal facilities along the various corridors. Given the remote, sparsely populated areas crossed by the proposed rail line, solid waste disposal facilities probably do not have sufficient capacity to handle waste generated during rail construction. Many times construction waste is not compatible with the waste handling facilities at existing sites. (Note: this same discussion applies to the intermodal transfer station and heavy-haul routes.)
Response
Section 6.3 of the EIS addresses waste generated by branch rail line construction and operation. It was assumed that the waste materials from construction and operation of a branch rail line would be transported to a facility with sufficient capacity to dispose of the waste material without any undue impacts. Should the mostly rail transportation scenario be selected and a preferred corridor identified, additional engineering and environmental studies would be initiated to select a specific alignment of the tracks within the selected corridor and evaluate the impacts of construction and operation of the branch rail line and supporting facilities. Appropriate National Environmental Policy Act reviews would be conducted to support selection of a specific alignment and design. Details on the location of such a facility would be further evaluated if a branch rail line was selected.
8.8.3 Special Topics
8.8.3 (171)
Comment - 42 comments summarized
Commenters disagreed with DOE’s conclusion that there would be no environmental justice impacts from spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste transportation to Yucca Mountain and stated that the Draft EIS findings regarding environmental justice were unjustified since analysis along specific transportation routes was not conducted. Commenters stated that actual routes on a segment-by-segment basis must be considered when estimating impacts (latent cancer fatalities) to low-income or minority communities. Commenters stated that it is well known that low-income and minority communities are located along railroads and highways and that DOE would need to name the transportation routes and prepare maps to show the locations of potentially affected minority and low-income populations. As analyzed in the EIS, it is impossible to assess whether impacts would fall inequitably on certain sectors of the population. Another commenter stated that the so-called "hypothetical" populations analyzed in the EIS in fact comprise low-income and minority populations that already have experienced disproportionate impacts and compromised their quality of life because of previous environmental decisionmaking. Commenters gave examples of specific communities that could be affected depending on the selected transportation route, such as the Duckwater and Ely Shoshone Reservations in Nevada, Interstate-70 through Denver, Interstate-90/State Route 2 "Shoreway" through Cleveland, communities in San Bernardino County, California, and the Interstate-25 corridor. Another commenter stated that certain types of trucks are barred from traveling on elevated highways (Interstate-70), and so must pass through minority neighborhoods near residences and schoolyards. Commenters stated that because of the generic nature of the national transportation analysis, DOE could not substantiate the statement that there would not be disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority or low-income populations from the Proposed Action.
Response
Consistent with Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, DOE performs environmental justice analyses to identify and address, as appropriate, the potential for its actions to cause disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority or low-income populations. The approach to environmental justice analysis in the Draft EIS and Final EIS is consistent with Council on Environmental Quality guidance. The goal of this approach is to identify whether any high and adverse impacts would fall disproportionately on minority and low-income populations. The approach first analyzes the potential impacts on the general population as a basis for comparison. Second, based on available information, the approach assesses whether there are unique exposure pathways, sensitivities, or cultural practices that would result in high and adverse impacts on minority and low-income populations. If such potential impacts would be high and adverse, the approach then compares the impacts on minority and low-income populations to those on the general population to determine whether any high and adverse impacts fall disproportionately on minority and low-income populations. In other words, if high and adverse impacts on a minority or low-income population would not appreciably exceed the same type of impacts on the general population, no disproportionately high and adverse impacts would be expected.
In response to comments, DOE has reevaluated available information to determine whether the Draft EIS overlooked any unique exposure pathways or unique resource uses that could create opportunities for disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority and low-income populations, even though the impacts to the general population would not be high and adverse. Additional unique pathways and resources were identified and analyzed, although none revealed a potential for disproportionately high and adverse impacts. For example, DOE estimated the potential health impacts from a subsistence diet based primarily on game taken from lands near the repository exclusion areas and concluded that high and adverse health and safety impacts would be unlikely.
DOE has updated and refined information germane to its environmental justice analysis. The EIS now includes, for example, additional and more detailed mapping of minority populations, and additional mapping and information that describes the proximity of tribal lands and cultural and ceremonial areas to candidate rail corridors in Nevada. Based on the additional information and resulting analysis, DOE has concluded that disproportionately high and adverse impacts from the construction and operation of a branch rail line or intermodal transfer facility would be unlikely.
The EIS analyzes potential public health effects of both routine (incident-free) transportation of radioactive materials and transportation accidents involving radioactive materials. First, regarding routine transportation, the EIS considers air emissions and doses from exposure to radioactive materials during transport. The EIS estimates the impacts from air emissions to be 1 emission-related fatality. The EIS estimates that the 24-year national transportation campaign would cause fewer than about 3 latent cancer fatalities among the public, and fewer under the preferred mostly rail scenario. Although many people would be exposed nationwide over a long campaign, the radiation dose to any exposed individual would be very low. In this context, DOE does not consider such impacts to be high. In addition, DOE does not know of a plausible mechanism under these circumstances by which low-income or minority populations could incur high and adverse impacts when the general public would not. Because there could be no disproportionately high and adverse impacts on any population, including low-income or minority populations, it is not necessary to examine the composition of the population along existing transportation corridors to conclude that potential public health effects from exposure to radioactive materials during routine transportation would not involve environmental justice concerns.
The EIS estimates the number of people in the general public who could be killed by accidents involving transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The two mechanisms for such impacts are bodily trauma from collisions or exposure to radioactivity that would be released if a sufficiently severe accident occurred. The EIS estimates that the 24-year national campaign would cause fewer than 5 deaths among the general public from trauma sustained in collisions with vehicles carrying spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste. In this context, DOE does not consider such impacts to be high. Moreover, DOE does not know of a plausible mechanism under these circumstances by which low-income or minority populations could incur high and adverse impacts when the general public would not.
Only if a severe accident occurred that resulted in release of radioactive materials would it be possible for the affected population to sustain high and adverse health effects, but the probability of such an event occurring is remote, so the overall associated risk to the general public would be low. Moreover, as is true of all transportation accidents, it is impossible to predict where along a transportation corridor an accident might occur (unlike accidents at fixed-facility locations), and, thus, who might be affected. Therefore, as with routine transportation and trauma effects of accidents, it is not necessary to examine the composition of the population along transportation corridors to conclude that the radiological risk resulting from transportation accidents would not constitute a disproportionately high and adverse impact on low-income or minority populations.
Although the transportation of radioactive materials would not result in disproportionately high and adverse impacts on low-income and minority populations, there are reasons to examine the composition of the population along newly proposed transportation corridors (such as the alternative locations of rail corridors within Nevada) that do not apply to existing highways and railways. When considering where to locate a new transportation corridor, the impacts of the construction and use of a newly created route on land use, socioeconomics, noise, air quality, and esthetics, to name a few categories, might vary by location. For example, constructing a new highway that might benefit the population as a whole might, nevertheless, so disrupt a minority or low-income population living along the proposed route as to result in disproportionately high and adverse impacts. Selecting among alternative new routes might offer opportunities to avoid high and adverse impacts that would fall disproportionately on low-income or minority populations in relation to the general population that would not be present when considering existing transportation corridors. Therefore, even though the health effects from exposure to radioactive materials from transportation activities would not involve environmental justice concerns in selecting new routes, other factors could. For these reasons, DOE examined the composition of the populations along the five alternative routes for a rail corridor in Nevada to determine the minority and low-income populations residing along the corridors.
In the EIS analyses, DOE assumed shipments would use highway routes that would comply with U.S. Department of Transportation regulations for transporting spent nuclear fuel. With the exception of routes to the nearest Interstate System highways or state or tribal designated preferred routes used to pick up shipments from generator sites and to deliver shipments to Yucca Mountain, Department of Transportation regulations require carriers to use Interstate System highways, bypasses, and beltways, or state or tribal designated preferred routes that reduce time in transit. DOE shipments would comply with these regulations.
8.8.3 (173)
Comment - 4 comments summarized
Commenters disagreed with DOE’s analysis of impacts at generator facilities of loading spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste into shipping casks and delivering the casks to carriers for transport to Yucca Mountain. One commenter observed that DOE’s estimate of 0.1 person-rem exposure to the public from loading spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste for transportation is much lower than impacts for other accidents analyzed in the EIS. The commenter asked what units of measure apply to the 0.1-person-rem impact – per year, per accident, per hour, average? The commenter suggested the estimate of 0.1 person-rem is based on experience to date but could be expected to increase as the quantities of spent nuclear fuel that are handled and loaded increase. This commenter disagreed with DOE’s assertion that risks associated with handling and loading high-level radioactive waste would be less than those from handling and loading spent nuclear fuel.
A commenter stated that the Schneider report (DIRS 101747-Schneider et al. 1987) does not provide valid information for evaluating impacts of loading spent nuclear fuel at generator sites. The commenter argued the report did not consider a much different loading scenario in which storage casks (which at the time of the Schneider report did not receive general certificates of compliance from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) would be unloaded into transportation casks at generator sites.
A commenter stated DOE did not address risks of or procedures to transfer spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from DOE or utilities to a carrier and must provide further analysis of waste transfer procedures, risks, modes among generators, carriers, and receiver.
A commenter observed that most accidents to date at nuclear powerplants have been industrial accidents, and asked what are DOE’s grounds for asserting there would be no worker fatalities from industrial accidents in loading spent nuclear fuel for transport?
Response
Section 6.2.4.1 and Table 6-16 of the EIS provide a summary of information on the impacts associated with accidents of handling and loading spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. DOE based its estimate of 0.1 person-rem per year to the onsite workforce, not the general population (see Table 6-16), on information presented in a report on health and safety impacts for the multipurpose canister system (DIRS 104794-CRWMS M&O 1994). This report estimated that impacts to members of the onsite workforce from a loading facility would be no more than 0.1 person-rem in the event of an accident in loading and handling a multipurpose canister system for transport. The collective dose to the public would be much less. This estimate is consistent with DOE estimates of offsite impacts from accidents at a monitored retrievable storage facility (DIRS 104731-DOE 1986). The estimated impact to workers and the public health and safety is for a single handling accident. DOE’s estimate for the rate for lift-handling accidents involving spent nuclear fuel casks presented in Section 6.2.4.1 is 1 in 10,000 handling operations.
These dose risks would be lower than those for transportation accidents for several reasons. The forces involved with a handling accident would be much less severe than those postulated for the maximum reasonably foreseeable transportation accident. Handling accidents would occur inside nuclear facilities designed to protect the public from the consequences of handling accidents and much more severe reactor accidents. DOE used information from Preliminary Preclosure Design Basis Event Calculations for the Monitored Geologic Repository as the basis for projecting that handling accidents involving loading high-level radioactive waste for transportation would have lower consequences than those involving loading spent nuclear fuel (DIRS 103237-CRWMS M&O 1998).
DOE based its estimates of impacts of loading spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste on Analysis of Radiation Doses from Operation of Postulated Commercial Spent Fuel Systems (DIRS 101747-Schneider et al. 1987). The information in this report is based on analysis of loading procedures and risks among generators at commercial nuclear facilities for shipping spent nuclear fuel using truck casks and rail casks. DOE believes this report provides the latest reasonable information for estimating impacts of loading spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at generator facilities. To estimate loading impacts, DOE assumed spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste would be available in locations where loading operations occur, for example storage pools at commercial nuclear reactors. DOE did not analyze the impacts of loading and unloading dry storage casks at nuclear facilities because these impacts are addressed in environmental analyses prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to support licensing of the independent storage facilities.
At present, DOE intends to purchase services and equipment from Regional Servicing Contractors who would perform waste acceptance and transportation operations. Operational protocols and procedures would be developed with each generator by Regional Servicing Contractors as part of the planning process to be completed prior to initiation of transport of spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste from generators to the repository. Section M.3 of the EIS contains more information on operational protocols required of the Regional Servicing Contractors.
Section 6.2.2.2 of the EIS presents an analysis of industrial safety impacts of loading spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at generator facilities. Because the estimates suggested there would be a 1-in-50 chance (2-percent probability) of one fatality from an industrial accident for the mostly rail scenario and a 1-in-20 chance (5-percent probability) for the mostly legal-weight truck scenario over 24 years of the Proposed Action, the EIS concluded no worker fatalities from industrial accidents would be expected.
8.8.3 (174)
Comment - 21 comments summarized
Commenters questioned the relevancy of the 30-year safety record of transporting spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste cited in the EIS for predicting the safety of future shipments to Yucca Mountain. Reasons given by commenters included (1) the proposed number of shipments is unprecedented and (2) the types of casks, procedures, and protocols used in the past are not applicable to the Proposed Action. Commenters also questioned DOE’s contention that the safety record is good, citing transportation accidents involving spent nuclear fuel and low-level waste (72 incidents from 1949 to the present according to a database at Sandia National Laboratories). Others argued that shipping casks have not yet been built and tested, so their performance is not yet known and the impacts of accidents cannot be judged. Commenters said that the EIS should have predicted accidents and described how they would be mitigated.
Commenters said DOE should use "shipment miles" rather than "number of shipments" as the measure for predicting safety, noting that the total number of shipment miles to date is very small compared to the total number of shipment miles associated with the repository. Some commenters stated that past shipments of spent nuclear fuel from a reactor’s core to its storage ponds should not even be considered a "shipment."
Response
Sections J.1.1 and J.1.4.2.1 of the EIS present the approach DOE used to estimate the number of accidents and the associated impacts that would occur in transporting spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to Yucca Mountain for the Proposed Action. As requested by public comments, DOE has included maps showing the routes used in the analysis and estimates of the state-by-state impacts based on these routes (see Section J.4). The approach, which is not based on the safety record of shipments of spent nuclear fuel over the past 30 years, uses U.S. Department of Transportation state-by-state accident and fatality statistics for highway, rail, and barge transportation. The statistics were compiled from accidents that occurred during all four seasons from 1994 through 1996 (DIRS 103455-Saricks and Tompkins 1999), which is the most current information of this type available. The approach includes the assumption that the number of potential accidents and impacts would be proportional to the number of total kilometers that shipments would travel in each state (number of cask shipments times distance traveled). Annual accident data were used and routes were assumed not to change with season. Thus, the number and impacts of accidents would be independent of the time of year travel would occur.
Total incident-free impacts for 24 years, which would be dependent on the total number of shipment kilometers, would not be affected by the time of year shipments were made if routes remained the same. Because accident rate data are not available for specialized logistical arrangements, such as convoys and dedicated trains, DOE assumed the industry-wide accident rates for individual truck, railcar, and barge shipments used in the EIS would apply. Because incident-free impacts would be proportional to the number of cask shipments over 24 years, transporting casks in multiples in convoys or dedicated trains would not affect these impacts. Because accidents at intermodal transfer facilities would not exceed cask design requirements, DOE estimated that radiological impacts would not occur for these (see Section J.3.3.1 of the EIS).
Section 6.3.3 of the EIS presents estimates for industrial safety impacts from operations at an intermodal transfer station in Nevada. In one area the approach for estimating the number and severity of accidents relied on historic experience. It assumed spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste would be properly packaged for shipment in Type B shipping casks certified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to comply with the performance standards contained in 10 CFR Part 71, as required by Commission and U.S. Department of Transportation regulations. Type A and strong-tight packaging, which are not accident-resistant (see 49 CFR 173.403), would not be used to ship spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste. The approach also assumed transport carriers’ operations and vehicles would comply with applicable Federal, state, Native American tribal, and local regulations; occur during all four seasons of the year; and resemble those used for other commodities transported in interstate commerce. DOE would ensure that shipments of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to Yucca Mountain and the return of empty shipping casks and vehicles for further use would comply fully with applicable Federal, state, tribal, and local regulations, including those of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. Department of Transportation (see Section 2.1.3.2). These regulations include, among other things, requirements for operator training, vehicle safety, records, communications and tracking, and security. These measures are implemented to minimize potential human errors and other conditions that could lead to accidents.
The analyses used "fatality" as the measure of impacts to the public because it is an easily understood objective measure used historically in EISs prepared by DOE. In response to public comments, DOE has included a discussion on the range of potential costs of cleanup following a severe transportation accident in Appendix J of the EIS. This discussion reviews costs for cleanup presented in past studies, including a report used in the 1986 Environmental Assessments (DIRS 154814-Sandquist et al. 1985), and information submitted by the State of Nevada in its comments on the Draft EIS. The information submitted by the State included estimates of cleanup costs as high as $9.4 billion. Cost data used in the studies included data compiled from case studies involving actual cleanup of radioactive material contamination. The studies addressed consequences for releases of radioactive materials in communities. In response to comments from the public, DOE has included additional information on Federal, state, tribal, and local responsibilities and preparedness for emergency response to accidents involving radioactive materials shipments (see Section M.5 of the EIS). Section M.8 discusses the Price-Anderson Act, which provides for indemnification for public liability to redress costs of accidents involving releases of radioactive materials to the environment or authorized precautionary evacuations.
8.8.3 (176)
Comment - 7 comments summarized
Commenters stated that because the EIS does not define floodplains within rail corridors, along heavy-haul truck routes, and at potential sites for an intermodal transfer station, the analysis of floodplains and wetlands in Appendix L is insufficient to support decisions to select a transport mode or route in Nevada.
Commenters said that wetlands, which some corridors are known to cross, are valuable resources in Nevada, and that it is not sufficient to simply state in the EIS that impacts to wetlands would be mitigated. Commenters also said that the floodplain information that is in the EIS has not been verified by ground surveys.
Commenters stated that the analysis of surface-water resources in the EIS is insufficient because it does not acknowledge that flooding and flash flooding can occur along parts of the rail corridors and along the heavy-haul truck routes. In wet years, parts of any rail line in Nevada could be covered with floodwater and these routes are not in an area that is appropriate for the shipment of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Referring to DOE’s commitment to temporarily stop shipments whenever flooding affected a route, commenters asked if these shipments would be parked and if a flash flood could be detected in time to stop a shipment before it was threatened by flood waters. Commenters stated that none of the candidate routes avoid designated groundwater basins. Other commenters said that flash floods entering Pahrump Valley from the Wheeler Pass area would require a large retention basin, and that the EIS did not address the impacts of this manmade structure.
Response
Sections 3.2.2.1.3 and 3.2.2.2.3 of the EIS present information concerning current conditions of potentially affected surface-water and groundwater resources along the candidate rail corridors, heavy-haul truck routes, and intermodal transfer station sites. Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 identify potential impacts on surface-water and groundwater resources along each candidate route and site for an intermodal transfer station. Appendix L examines the effects on floodplains and areas that could have wetlands in Nevada of construction and operation and a branch rail line or intermodal transfer station associated with routes for heavy-haul trucks. The assessment in Appendix L did not evaluate potential floodplain or wetlands effects along highway routes because these existing roads should already be designed to meet 100-year floodplain design specifications. Appendix L states that if DOE decided to construct a branch rail line or use heavy-haul trucks in Nevada, a more detailed floodplain/wetlands assessment of the selected rail corridor or route for heavy-haul trucks and associated intermodal transfer station site would be prepared. However, DOE has added additional flood zone information to the floodplain/wetlands assessment in Appendix L. Specifically, the appendix now identifies 100-year flood zones crossed by rail corridors or their alignment variations if such information is available on maps published by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
DOE would select the specific alignment within a corridor and design of a branch rail line or specific location and design of an intermodal transfer station to preclude flood water, including water from flash floods, from a 100-year flood from inundating rail track or facility operations areas. Engineering designs used as a basis for the EIS considered the potential for flooding along candidate routes and sites for an intermodal transfer station. The designs included culverts and bridges that would be needed to accommodate water from a 100-year flood.
If DOE decided to construct a branch rail line or an intermodal transfer station, it would require a hydrological analysis and evaluate the impacts of designing for floods for 25, 50, and 100 years. Critical areas might require the design to address a 100-year storm, based on appropriate engineering criteria.
As stated in the Manual for Railway Engineering, "The design flood frequency to be used is a matter of engineering judgement and economics. A number of trials should be made using a wide range of frequencies. In this way the possibilities of damage because of too small an opening can be assessed. The cost of providing for the maximum possible flood of 100 years frequency or greater can also be determined and a prudent decision made. In general practice, railroad drainage openings should be designed for floods in the range of 25 to 50 years. This does not imply that a 100-year flood design would be out of place in certain instances" (DIRS 106860-AREA 1997).
Disturbed area estimated in Chapter 6 of the EIS for each candidate branch rail line, highway route for heavy-haul trucks, and site for an intermodal transfer station includes areas for retention basins and engineered flow channels. DOE would temporarily discontinue shipments of spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste that would use a highway or rail route where flooding could compromise safety. Shipments that were underway at the time of an ongoing or potential flooding event would be temporarily delayed at a safe, secure location along the route until the affected section of track, roadway, or intermodal transfer station was determined to be safe for use. DOE would monitor weather forecasts to ensure shipments would not occur in areas where, and at times when, the potential for flash flooding could compromise safety.
Groundwater basins underlie all areas of Nevada including areas where shipments would travel. Designated groundwater basins identified in Chapter 6 of the EIS are basins for which the Nevada State Engineer has determined that permitted water rights approach or exceed the estimated perennial water or that additional administrative oversight is required. Designated Groundwater Basins are identified to provide information regarding availability of groundwater needed for constructing a branch rail line or upgrading highways for use by heavy-haul trucks. As described in Section 6.3 of the EIS, DOE would transport water by truck to construction areas if it could not obtain permits for withdrawals from a Designated Groundwater Basin.
Chapter 9 of the EIS, which provides DOE’s initial list of mitigation commitments available at this time, identifies DOE-determined impact reduction features, procedures, and safeguards and mitigation measures under consideration for inclusion in the project plan and design. Chapter 9 also identifies ongoing studies that could eventually influence mitigation measures related to the project plan and design. For example, Section 9.3 discusses mitigation measures to reduce potential impacts from the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste nationally and in Nevada. These measures address impacts from the possible construction of a branch rail line or an intermodal transfer station in Nevada; construction of other transportation routes; upgrading of existing Nevada highways to accommodate heavy-haul vehicles; transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste from existing storage sites to the proposed repository; and fabrication of casks and canisters. As suggested Chapter 6 and Section 11.2.2 (subsection on Compliance with Floodplain/Wetlands Environmental Review Requirements), more detailed field surveys, government consultation, analyses, and appropriate National Environmental Policy Act reviews would be conducted if a decision was made to select a specific rail alignment within a corridor or a specific location of an intermodal transfer station or the need to upgrade the associated heavy-haul truck routes. These would include consultations with State wildlife management agencies, the Bureau of Land Management, the Army Corps of Engineers, and other applicable government agencies. They also would include field surveys (as applicable) and more detailed assessments and analyses of wetlands and other waters; floodplains; sensitive species; effects of habitat fragmentation, interruption of movements, mortality, and harassment on wildlife, horses, and burrows; loss of hunter-generated revenue, spread of noxious weeds, and soils.
8.8.3 (177)
Comment - 8 comments summarized
Commenters stated that the EIS is inadequate because it did not consider the effects of the proposed Private Fuel Storage facility in Skull Valley, Utah, on transportation of spent nuclear fuel to Yucca Mountain. Commenters expressed concern that utilities would ship their older commercial spent nuclear fuel currently in storage to the Private Fuel Storage facility (if it is licensed), before a repository at Yucca Mountain was constructed. Therefore, at a later date, much younger and more radioactive spent nuclear fuel from commercial facilities would be shipped to the Yucca Mountain Repository. Commenters argued that DOE’s Acceptance Priority Ranking (DIRS 104382-DOE 1995) did not consider the Private Fuel Storage facility in determining the order in which spent nuclear fuel would be delivered to Yucca Mountain. Commenters stated that NUREG-1437 (DIRS 101899-NRC 1996 and DIRS 101900-NRC 1996) states that the minimum cooling time for transporting spent nuclear fuel is 5 years; however, the Draft EIS used a cooling time of 25.8 years to assess health impacts. Based on this information, the cooling time for spent nuclear fuel used in the EIS